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Vermont lawmakers had grappled with the thorny issue of how to finance public education 
long before the Vermont Supreme Court’s landmark 1997 ruling that the state's funding 
system was unconstitutional.  In that case, Brigham vs. State, the court found that the system 
in effect at that time violated the state's constitutional guarantee to equal protection under 
the law and directed the Legislature to establish a system that would afford “substantially 
equal opportunity” to all Vermont school children.  Less than six months after this ruling, 
lawmakers enacted the Equal Educational Opportunity Act (known as Act 60), under which 
tax rates and educational opportunities were substantially equalized across school districts 
by redefining property wealth—for educational purposes—as a state resource.  
 
Act 60 and its successor, Act 68, both narrowed disparities in educational funding across 
school districts. But the issue of who pays for education remains contentious, with calls for 
further reform driven by the perception that education property tax burdens are 
unreasonably high and remain inequitable. Vermonters are concerned about rapidly rising 
education property tax burdens, which some people blame on Acts 60 and 68, though rising 
real estate values have recently played a larger role. Some believe that their inability to use 
local property wealth to fund local education expenditures is unfair. 
 
During this biennium session, the Legislature is expected to consider a range of reform 
proposals, including repeal of the current system. To help inform this debate, this paper 




Early attempts at education finance reform (1969–1997) 
 
For decades before the Brigham vs. State ruling, Vermont towns funded public education 
primarily with local property tax revenues. This system supported variable funding levels 
and, by extension, different educational opportunities in towns of different property wealth. 
Property owners in districts with low property wealth generally faced higher property tax 
rates to fund relatively limited school budgets, while property owners in towns with high 
property wealth funded larger school budgets on relatively low property tax rates. No matter how much voters were willing to tax themselves, poorer districts’ lower property wealth 
constrained their education spending. Taxpayers, parents, and school administrators in such 
property-poor towns thus became increasingly concerned that depending upon local 
resources to fund education resulted in unequal educational opportunities.  
 
Before Brigham vs. State, the Legislature had attempted to address growing concern about 
these inequities mainly by increasing the share of state funding for education and targeting 
available state revenues on the neediest districts. However, maintaining the higher levels of 
state funding needed for significant local property tax relief proved difficult. Mathis (2001) 
notes that between 1964 and 1997, the state’s share of basic educational expenditures varied 
between 20 percent and 37 percent and that reform initiatives in Vermont typically followed 
a decline in state funding.  
 
What state resources were available were distributed according to various formulas designed 
to fund more equitable educational opportunities across districts of varying property wealth. 
In 1969, Vermont created the Miller formula, which sought to equalize funding across 
districts by accounting for property wealth when distributing state aid. In 1982, the 
Legislature passed Act 170, distributing newly available state aid to communities through 
the Morse-Giuliani formula, which based aid on both district property wealth and income.  
In 1988, Vermont established a state education foundation aid program to enable each 
school district to fund a state-defined, minimum quality education, also known as the 
foundation cost. Towns received state aid equal to the difference between the foundation 
cost and how much revenue they could raise from local resources at a state-established 
property tax rate. After two years of state funding increases, however, the fiscal crisis of the 
1990s forced cuts in the state’s contribution to the foundation aid program. To compensate, 
local contributions increased to maintain foundation levels. As a result, local property 
owners maintained primary responsibility for funding education spending in Vermont.  
 
Because local property taxes remained the mainstay of education spending, unequal 
education funding and property tax rates persisted. Downes (2003) notes that between 
FY1990 and FY1995, districts with high property wealth increased expenditures at an 
annual rate of 3.8 percent, while districts with low property wealth increased expenditures 
by only 1.9 percent.  Many property-rich communities funded high levels of education 
spending on relatively low tax rates, while their neighbors in property-poor towns faced 
high tax rates to fund more modest educational spending levels. In 2001, the Vermont 
Department of Education reported that in 1997, tax rates in Vermont ranged from a low of 
$0.12 per $100 of property value to fund per-pupil local education spending level of $12,300 
to a high of $2.28 per $100 of value to fund $7,850 in spending.  This persistent inequity 
prompted plaintiffs from property-poor towns to challenge the constitutionality of the 
system in court, leading to Brigham vs. State. 
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 Brigham vs. State (1997) 
 
Frustrated with what it saw as the Legislature’s inability to craft a viable solution, the 
Vermont chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union challenged the constitutionality of 
the state’s education finance system, suing on behalf of three groups of plaintiffs alleging 
both distinct and overlapping claims. Students from property-poor school districts claimed 
that the educational funding system denied their constitutional rights by creating unequal 
educational opportunities between property-poor and property-rich districts. Property 
owners from property-poor districts also claimed the system compelled them to contribute 
more than a just proportion of their income to fund education.  The property-poor districts 
themselves claimed that because they were deprived of the ability to raise sufficient funds, 
they were compelled to levy disproportionately heavy tax rates on their residents. All three 
plaintiff groups argued that the education finance system denied them the equal protection 
right afforded by the Vermont Constitution’s common benefits clause, which is analogous to 
the U.S. Constitution’s equal protection clause.  
 
Vermont was not the only state to face court challenges to its education finance system. 
Beginning in the 1960s, residents of property-poor communities around the country 
similarly argued that their rights were being violated by education finance systems, typically 
citing either equal protection clauses in their states’ constitutions or more specific 
constitutional language about education. Under the latter, plaintiffs argued that property 
wealth in property-poor towns was insufficient to fund constitutionally guaranteed minimal 
or adequate levels of educational opportunity. The plaintiffs in Vermont focused on their 
constitutional right to equal educational opportunity because they believed they had a 
better chance of winning their case under the Vermont Constitution’s explicit guarantee of 
equal protection. Further, establishing a constitutional right to an adequate or even minimal 
level of education could result in a Pyrrhic victory: students living in property-poor towns 
might receive a better education than they had previously enjoyed, but the tax base 
available to schools in property-rich towns would mean that peers living in these places 
could continue to enjoy an even better one.   
 
In its February 5, 1997, Brigham ruling, the Supreme Court concurred with the plaintiffs. 
Vermont’s method of funding public education, the court said, “…deprives children of an 
equal educational opportunity in violation of the Vermont Constitution.”  And while it 
conceded that unequal resources did not necessarily yield unequal effects or outcomes, the 
court declared that “…there is no reasonable doubt that substantial funding differences 
significantly affect opportunities to learn.” 
 
The Supreme Court directed the state to establish a system where “children who live in 
property-poor districts and children who live in property-rich districts should be afforded a 
substantially equal opportunity to have access to similar educational revenues.” The ruling 
called for the establishment of an education finance system that was equitable and that no 
longer tied local education spending to local property wealth (i.e., a system that would be 
wealth-neutral). Responsibility for the design of this new system was left to elected 
officials.   
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 Act 60 (1997) 
 
The Legislature responded with the Equal Educational Opportunity Act, more commonly 
known as Act 60, which transferred primary responsibility for funding education to the state. 
Under the new system, education was principally funded through two state-established 
taxes on the same resource: a state-share property tax and a local-share property tax. These 
and other important components of Act 60 are described below. 
 
•  State-share property tax funds equal per-pupil block grants 
Under Act 60, equal per-pupil block grants received by towns were the foundation for 
greater equality of education funding. The state intended these grants to cover the 
majority of education expenses. In FY1997, the state block grant was established at 
$5,200 per pupil. The block grants were financed primarily by a new state-share 
education property tax, which in FY1997 was set at  a uniform rate of $1.10 per $100 of 
equalized value for both homestead and non-homestead property. (A homestead is 
defined as a principal dwelling occupied by a resident plus up to two acres of land 
surrounding that dwelling.) 
 
The new education property tax, as well as some earmarked state revenues, was the 
main source of revenue for the education fund that financed the block grants. Education 
fund revenues collected in excess of appropriations were captured in an education fund 
budget stabilization reserve to mitigate the potential impact of a deficit in the education 
fund. If revenues in the reserve account were to exceed 5 percent of the prior year’s 
education fund, Act 60 allowed the state to use revenues collected above this threshold 
to fund increased support for education. 
 
•  Education spending above the block grant financed by local-share property taxes 
Many Vermont towns wanted to provide educational opportunities above those afforded 
by the state grant.  Under Act 60, education spending above the block grant was 
financed by revenues collected on a local-share property tax. A town’s local-share tax 
rate depended on how much per-pupil spending above the block grant it approved; the 
rates were set by the state only after all towns had had an opportunity to approve 
additional spending. The rates were set such that towns approving the same level of per-
pupil spending above the block grant had the same local-share property tax rate, 
regardless of property wealth. 
 
Because the local-share tax rate was a function of spending and not local property 
wealth, property-rich communities raised more local-share revenues than the additional 
spending they approved. The excess local-share revenues they generated was captured 
in the education fund and redistributed to towns in which local-share tax revenues 
raised from comparable tax rates were lower than the additional spending they 
approved. For example, Town A had $1,500 of property value per pupil and Town B 
had $500 of property value per pupil. Both approved $1,000 in per-pupil spending above 
the state block grant. The design of the local-share tax meant that they had the same 
local-share tax rate. The local-share tax rate applied to Town A’s property generated 
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 $1,500 per pupil, which was $500 above the approved additional $1,000 in per-pupil 
spending. But under the same tax rate, Town B’s more limited property wealth yielded 
only $500 per pupil, not enough to afford the additional $1,000 of approved per-pupil 
spending. Under this scenario, $500 of local-share revenues collected in Town A would 
have been contributed to the state education fund and redistributed to subsidize Town 
B’s education spending.  Such redistribution among towns guaranteed that each town 
would receive the same yield in funding above the block-grant level for each additional 
penny on its local-share property tax rate.
1
 
Because it is largely financed by revenues raised on local-share property tax rates, Act 
60’s mechanism for redistributing revenues is commonly referred to as the municipal 
sharing pool. In theory, the local-share tax rates could be set to ensure that the total 
local-share property tax revenues collected exactly equaled above-block grant spending 
approved in all towns. This would have eliminated the need for the state to subsidize 
education spending approved above the block grant. In practice, the state subsidized the 
sharing pool annually, enabling a larger amount of locally approved spending for a given 
local-share tax rate. 
 
•  Property values equalized annually 
Act 60 required annual equalization of the assessed value of property; previously, 
equalization had occurred every other year. Equalization means reassessing property at 
fair market value. Though responsibility for property appraisal and the development and 
maintenance of local property tax rolls (known as “grand lists”) lies with localities, Act 
60 required the state to equalize local grand list values annually for education purposes. 
A statewide grand list of fair market values was established for this purpose. The ratio of 
the aggregate value of the local property tax grand list to the aggregate value of the 
statewide grand list for each town is called its “common level of appraisal.”  A common 
level of appraisal less than one indicates that a town’s aggregate local property value is 
listed below the state-determined fair market value for these properties. Through the 
common level of appraisal, the state ensures that education property taxes are applied to 
fair market value regardless of local assessment practices.
2  
 
•  Homestead education property tax adjustments for school property tax relief for 
low- and moderate-income residents 
While the court did not specifically rule on the inequity of tax burdens alleged by the 
plaintiffs in Brigham, the Legislature incorporated income sensitivity provisions for 
residents into Act 60.  Homestead property owners with annual household incomes of 
less than $75,000 could pay their state education property tax liability based on one of 
two formulas: the lesser of 2.0 percent of household income or the amount of state 
                                                 
1 Vermont’s education finance system is often referred to as a “guaranteed yield system” (GTY) in economics 
literature. 
2 In practice, the state adjusts local property tax rates to accommodate for a town’s common level of appraisal. 
Towns with common levels of appraisal that are less than one experience an increase in their total tax rate. For 
more information at the mechanics of the common level of appraisal, please refer to A Citizen's Guide to the CLA: 
Vermont's Common Level of Appraisal Adjustment for School Taxes, Public Assets Institute, 2006. 
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 education property tax assessed on the homestead after reducing its equalized value by 
$15,000. The property tax adjustment received by claimants who benefit from paying on 
the basis of income is called a “prebate”; such claimants receive a check for the 
difference between the education property tax liability due on their property and the tax 
due as a percentage of their household income. The check is so-named because it is 
received prior to the first education property tax payment due date.   
 
Homestead property owners with household incomes of greater than $75,000 had no 
options for property tax relief until 1999, when technical adjustments to Act 60 provided 
some relief to households earning higher incomes.
3 After these adjustments, all 
homestead property owners could limit the education property tax liability due on the 
first $160,000 of property value to 2.0 percent of household income. Households 
remained liable for the full education property tax liability of property value above this 
threshold.   
 
Under Act 60, homestead property owners with household incomes under $47,000 could 
take advantage of an additional homeowner rebate.  The rebate is a credit for property 
taxes for both municipal and education purposes paid in excess of a defined percentage 
of household income, ranging from 3.5 to 5 percent and based on a sliding income scale.   
 
New perceptions of inequity 
Some evaluations of Act 60, which was fully implemented by the 2001-2002 school year, 
found that the act successfully responded to Brigham’s requirements for more substantially 
equal educational opportunities and wealth neutrality. A 2001 assessment by the Vermont 
Department of Education found that Act 60 had eliminated the wide variation in tax rates 
and that education spending was equalized across school districts. Other evaluations found 
similar evidence (Downes, 2002, Jimerson 2001, Mathis 2001).  
 
Some praised Act 60 as the fairest way to fund education, but others—including Vermont 
resident author John Irving—dubbed it Marxism. While effective in weakening the link 
between property wealth and local education spending, Act 60’s redistribution of local-share 
tax revenues was a source of contention in property-rich communities. Many felt that local 
resources should be used for local purposes, an argument that disregarded the fact that Act 
60 met Brigham’s requirements by redefining property, for education purposes, as a state 
resource. This sentiment that property tax wealth is a local resource that should be 
controlled locally has reemerged in recent reform proposals.  
 
Property-rich communities were concerned about Act 60 partially because it led to lower 
per-pupil spending than many of them had previously undertaken. Under the prior regime, 
towns with substantial property wealth supported large education budgets on relatively low 
tax rates.  Under Act 60, for “Gold Towns”—a quasi-official term for any town that 
collected more revenues than it spent—the state block grant provided for less per-pupil 
                                                 
3 Act 49: An Act Relating to Equal Education Opportunity Omnibus Act (1999).  
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 spending than the town had previously enjoyed. But voters in property-rich towns had little 
incentive to approve spending above the block grant because the redistribution of local-
share revenues cost them more in local taxes than the additional spending they approved.  
 
Property-rich towns sought to escape the high cost of additional local spending in several 
ways. Some significantly cut school budgets so that they spent closer to the per-pupil 
amount afforded by the block grant. A few threatened not to send property tax revenues 
they collected for education to the state for redistribution, though in the end, all towns 
complied with state requirements. Other property-rich towns financed spending above the 
block grant privately, through local education foundations: nonprofit organizations with the 
express purpose of raising resources outside the tax base for education.  Downes (2006) 
noted that foundations in towns with as few as 1,000 residents raised more than $1 million 
in annual revenue. The Vermont Department of Education reported that in FY03, more 
than $12.2 million in private donations contributed to school budgets that year. 
 
Large, out-of-state “Gold Town” property owners were especially upset with Act 60’s 
perceived inequities. Several Vermont ski towns and surrounding resort areas host large, 
highly valued properties owned by non-residents or non-locally headquartered businesses.  
Under Act 60’s equalized state property tax, these large property owners paid the bulk of 
their communities’ state education property tax. Further, since they were not residents, 
they had no opportunity to vote on the local education spending that established their local-
share tax rate.  
 
In 1998, a year after Brigham, plaintiffs from Gold Towns argued in Anderson and Stevens vs. 
State that Act 60’s disincentives forced them to spend less on education than property-poor 
towns, eventually rendering unequal educational opportunity for their students. They 
contended that funding would eventually become unequally low because, in addition to 
limiting spending in property-rich towns, Act 60 gave towns with limited property wealth an 
incentive to spend more. The Vermont Supreme Court dismissed a trial court’s summary 
judgment that found for the plaintiffs on the grounds that the case involved speculation 
about future events, rather than an actual controversy the court could consider. 
 
 
The next Act: 68 (2003) 
 
Though several adjustments were made to Act 60 before its full implementation in 2001, 
the inequities perceived by taxpayers in property-rich towns were not substantially 
addressed until the passage of Act 68 in 2003. While Act 68 maintained many of Act 60’s 
provisions—including property tax adjustments for eligible resident households and the 
common level of appraisal—it made two significant changes. First, it split the homestead 
and non-homestead education property tax rates. Second, it made a town’s education 
property tax rate proportional to the spending approved by its residents, not on spending 
above the block grant approved by all towns. These and other important components of Act 
68 are discussed below. 
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 •  Differing tax rates for homestead and non-homestead property  
Under Act 60, homestead and non-homestead property within a town was taxed at the 
same rate.  Act 68 split how a town’s homestead and non-homestead tax rates were set, 
insulating the non-homestead property tax rate from local education spending choices. 
Under this system, still in effect today, the education property tax base rate for non-
homestead property is set annually by the state. The rate for FY2005, which was the first 
year that Act 68 went into effect, was set at $1.54 per $100 of equalized value.  
 
Insulating the non-homestead property tax from local spending decisions earned Act 68 
more support than its predecessor. It relieved non-local property owners of paying for 
additional local education spending upon which they could not vote. Further, residents’ 
complaints about the inequity of redistributing local-share revenues to fund locally 
approved spending largely evaporated once non-homestead property no longer financed 
that spending. Non-homestead property wealth was distributed especially unequally 
among Vermont towns, and the redistribution of local-share tax revenues raised on these 
properties under Act 60 had been considered especially onerous.  
 
•  Homestead property tax rate set proportional to local spending 
Act 68 also modified how homestead property tax rates are set. Instead of being subject 
to both a state-share and local-share education tax rate, homestead property is now taxed 
at only one education rate. Unlike the situation under Act 60, a town’s final homestead 
education property tax rate is proportional only to the level of spending its residents 
approve—it is no longer a function of other towns’ spending decisions. In FY2005, the 
state set the base homestead property tax rate at $1.05 per $100 of equalized value.  If a 
town approved spending 5 percent more than the annual state per-pupil block grant, its 
state homestead education tax rate increased by 5 percent above the base homestead 
property tax rate (Vermont Department of Education, 2004). 
 
Excess revenues collected on local tax rates are still redistributed between communities 
through the state education fund. After accounting for prebates and rebates due to 
eligible residents, towns unable to raise enough revenues on their property base to 
support approved per-pupil spending are subsidized by the state education fund. Towns 
that collect more revenues than needed to fund approved per-pupil spending continue 
to contribute to the fund.   
 
Several changes under Act 68 greatly reduced the degree of redistribution from 
property-rich to property-poor towns. First, the state per-pupil block grant was increased 
to $6,800 as of FY2005, providing all towns with a larger foundation from which to start.
4  
Second, as noted above, insulating non-homestead property from local spending choices 
reduced the degree of such redistribution. Put another way, the tax price—or the cost of 
funding an additional dollar of per-pupil spending locally above the state block grant—
declined. Schmidt and Scott (2004) noted that under Act 60, taxpayers in 37 towns paid 
                                                 
4 The larger block grant is not entirely funded by education property taxes; increases in the state sales and 
telecommunications and other taxes comprise approximately one-third of the education fund. 
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 more than $2 for each additional dollar of education spending they approved; taxpayers 
in several towns paid much more. Under Act 68, taxpayers in only a few towns paid more 
than $1 for each additional dollar of spending they approved. The reduced cost of Act 68 
is evidenced by the fact that property-rich towns opted to participate fully in the system: 
according to data collected by the Vermont Department of Education, private 
fundraising for schools through local education foundations declined significantly after 
Act 68’s full implementation in 2005.   
 
The reduced cost of local spending provides incentive for towns—especially property-
rich towns—to spend more. While this has the potential of yielding greater funding 
inequities across districts, a potential violation of Brigham, Schmidt and Scott (2004) 
estimated that the inequity would increase only marginally relative to existing 
inequities. The authors estimated that approved increases in per-pupil spending in 
property-rich towns would, on average, increase only $65 more than the spending 
increases approved by voters in property-poor towns.  
 
However, some feel that disparity in education spending between property-rich and 
property-poor districts has grown in recent years. And data suggest that education 
funding is currently unequal across the state: the state Department of Education 
reported that per-pupil spending ranged from $7,628 per pupil in Woodford to $13,325 
per pupil in Dummerston in FY2006.
5 This spending difference is similar to the 
disparity which prompted the Brigham plaintiffs to file suit in 1997. However, taxpayers 
in property-poor towns may be less upset than in the past about the disparity because 
the tax rates they face seem more equitable. Before Brigham, property-poor towns had to 
levy disproportionately high tax rates to fund relatively low spending levels. Under Act 
68, each town’s tax rate is more proportionate to its spending level. In FY2006, 
Woodford paid for $7,628 per pupil on a homestead property tax rate of $1.11 per $100 of 
equalized value, while Dummerston paid for its $13,325 per-pupil spending on $2.06 per 
$100 of equalized value.   
 
Act 68 also includes a provision to curtail local education spending in property-rich 
towns. Towns that spend more than a set percentage above the previous year’s state per-
pupil average are subject to an additional tax rate. Initially, Act 68 allowed towns to 
spend up to 135 percent above the prior year’s state per-pupil average without facing 
this tax penalty. Beginning in FY2007, towns spending more than 125 percent above the 
average face the penalty. The penalty is assessed by double-counting any spending 
above the threshold when determining a town’s homestead property tax rate. For 
example, a community that spent $500 above the threshold would have a homestead tax 
rate set as if it the town had actually spent $1,000 per pupil above the threshold.  
 
                                                 
5 The Vermont Department of Education reports per-pupil spending by size and type of district. This analysis 
compares per-pupil spending between towns that operate an elementary school and belong to a union or joint 
high school. A plurality of Vermont’s town districts (108 out of 206 schools listed in 11 categories) operate this 
type of school district. 
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 •  Additional property tax adjustments  
Act 68 preserved the prebate and the rebate programs for eligible households and 
provided additional property tax adjustments for all property owners in the event of a 
surplus in the education fund budget stabilization reserve. When the projected balance 
of the reserve is more than the 5 percent of education fund appropriations, the state may 
reduce the base homestead and non-homestead education property tax rates. In recent 
years, appreciating property values have yielded robust education property tax 
collections, allowing the state to reduce the base tax rates. Between FY2005 and 
FY2006, the base homestead rate declined from $1.05 to $1.02 per $100 of equalized 
value and the non-homestead base rate declined from $1.54 to $1.51 per $100 of 
equalized value. Further, Act 68 required the state to make proportional adjustments to 
the base percentage of income that claimants paying their homestead education 
property tax on the basis of income remain liable for. In FY2006, the base percent of 
income was reduced to 1.85 percent. 
 
 
Current reform drivers  
 
While Act 68 responded to the perceived inequities of Act 60’s finance mechanisms, its 
changes have not completely eased taxpayer discontent. Rising property values and the 
growing cost of education have made the cost of providing substantially equal education 
opportunities burdensome for some. Taxpayers whose property tax bills have inflated 
rapidly have not experienced significant relief from the modest reductions in the base 
property tax rates. Some are concerned that specific groups are paying a disproportionate 
share of the state’s education costs. Others still chafe at not being able to directly use local 
property wealth for local school budgets. The following section investigates major factors 
behind discontent with the current education finance system. 
 
Increased education spending 
Tax burdens for education are growing, in part because the costs of educating Vermont 
students are growing. Reporting to the General Assembly, the 2004 Joint Legislative 
Education Cost Containment Committee noted that despite declining student enrollment, 
education spending in Vermont grew faster than inflation between 1996 and 2002. In 
September 2006, the Vermont Joint Fiscal Office projected that education spending would 
grow by 5.6 percent in nominal terms for FY2007 and FY2008, despite further projected 
declines in enrollment. 
 
While a legislative cost containment study identified factors beyond the education finance 
system for such increasing education costs, the design of Acts 60 and 68 may also contribute. 
Act 60 responded to Brigham vs. State’s requirement for more substantially equal educational 
opportunities by supporting more spending in property-poor towns. The Vermont 
Department of Education analyzed changes in per-pupil expenditures in towns, grouping 
towns into quintiles defined by property wealth. Between FY1998 and FY2001, towns with 
the most property wealth increased expenditures by only 2.3 percent on average, while 
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 communities with less property wealth increased per-pupil budget expenditures up to 24.0 
percent on average. As noted previously, limited expenditure increases in the top group 
reflected the high cost that taxpayers in property wealthy communities faced for spending 
above the block grant. Act 68 reduced that penalty, increasing the incentive for property-
rich communities to spend more. Schmidt and Scott (2004) estimated that Act 68 
encouraged local voters to spend an additional $24.4 million on education.  
 
Growing property values and slow income growth 
While the cost of education has increased, rapidly rising property values and relatively 
sluggish income growth are the primary cause of currently high education property tax 
burdens. Between 1997 and 2005, home values in Vermont increased, in real terms, by 55.4 
percent; between 2003 and 2005, housing prices appreciated by over 10 percent annually in 
real terms. However, according to the author’s analysis of data published in the 2005 
Current Population Survey, average real household income actually fell for all income 
quintiles in Vermont between 2003 and 2005.
6
 
Property values are exploding for certain towns and types of property. This volatility is 
especially burdensome in places where local grand lists are not updated to reflect fair 
market values, often due to limited sales volume or local appraisal capacity. For example, 
the Vermont League of Cities and Towns reported that in 2005, rapid increases in the 
state’s equalized grand list of fair market property values relative to values listed in local 
grand lists resulted in sharp increases in property tax burdens for the small towns of Morgan 
and West Windsor. In that year, the difference between listed local property values and 
state-defined fair market values widened, resulting in a 20 percent decline in their common 
levels of appraisal. To compensate, the listed property values were increased to ensure that 
the education property tax was applied to equalized values. This low common level of 
appraisal meant that the education property tax burdens in these towns increased 
significantly over a very short period of time.   
 
Fair market values are projected to continue to increase. In September 2006, the Vermont 
Joint Fiscal Office forecast that the value of the state education grand list will grow by more 
than 13 percent annually in both FY2007 and FY2008, despite the cooling regional real 
estate market. Though addressing appreciating property values is largely beyond the 
purview of the education finance system, some have called for reforms in the method for 
determining common levels of appraisal, with an eye to constraining upward adjustments by 
the state.  
 
Concern about shifts in the distribution of the education tax burden 
Most Vermonters can take advantage of provisions that limit their education property tax 
relative to income, thus insulating their education property tax bill from a booming real 
estate market. In 2005, a House study committee noted that more than 70 percent of 
                                                 
6 U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey, 2005. Analysis refers to the three-year moving 
average of Vermont real household income by quintile (2001-2003 and 2003-2005).   
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 Vermont homestead owners were eligible for the prebates and rebates, some are concerned 
that not all eligible households are taking advantage of the provision.  
 
Though technically all Vermont homestead property owners are eligible for at least part of 
the state’s income-sensitivity provisions, not all benefit by participating. According to the 
Vermont Joint Fiscal Office, households with income of more than 55 percent of their 
homestead property value do not benefit because their income-adjusted liability is more 
than their property tax bill. Until 2005, if a taxpayer’s household income was greater than 
$88,000 (55 percent of the $160,000 property value that all residents can “income-
sensitize”), there was no mechanism for a property tax adjustment.  
 
Homestead property owners unable to benefit from income sensitivity provisions have 
become concerned that they are bearing a disproportionate share of the growing cost of 
education. Increasing education costs and property values have resulted in large increases in 
their property tax bills, while those paying their education property tax liability as a 
percentage of their relatively slow-growing incomes have experienced smaller property tax 
bill increases. Non-homestead property owners, none of whom are eligible for the 
Vermont’s income sensitivity provisions, are concerned about a perceived education tax 
shift between homestead and non-homestead property classes. Some analysis suggests that 
non-homestead property taxpayers are paying a growing percentage of the total state 
education tax. Analysis of preliminary education tax data reveals a slight shift in education 
property tax burden between homestead and non-homestead property classes from FY2005 
to FY2007, when the non-homestead share of the education tax grew from 58.8 percent to 
59.1 percent and the resident or homestead owners’ share declined from 41.2 percent to 
40.9 percent.  
 
 
Post-Act 68 changes and proposals for reform 
In recent years, the following actions or proposals sought to make both incremental and 
comprehensive reforms to Act 68 to address voter discontent with growing education costs, 
the property tax adjustment provisions, and taxable property values.  
 
Act 38: 2005 
In 2005, the Legislature increased eligibility for the prebate program to provide more 
property tax relief against rapidly accelerating property values. Under Act 38, homeowners 
with household incomes of $85,000 or less in 2006 (increasing to $90,000 in 2007) can 
choose to pay their education taxes through property taxes or replace the property tax with a 
tax based on income. Further, Act 38 raised the amount of homestead value that could be 
income-sensitized to $200,000.  As previously noted, households earning up to 55 percent of 
the value of their home generally benefit from these provisions. With this change, 
households earning up to $110,000 (55 percent of $200,000) can benefit from income-
sensitivity provisions.   
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 The eligibility expansion increased the cost of the prebate program.  In September 2006, 
Vermont’s Joint Fiscal Office reported that prebates cost the state $81.2 million: 23.4 
percent of the $346.6 million homestead education tax revenues collected that year. For 
FY2007, the prebate programs was projected to cost the state $107.0 million, or 25.4 percent 
of projected homestead education tax revenues.  
 
Act 38 also created an education program for municipal property listers and assessors to 
improve local valuation practices in an effort to mitigate dramatic equalization of property 
values and resulting sharp increases in tax burdens. The act also established a committee to 
propose further changes in how the state’s property tax adjustment provisions are 
administered and to investigate financing education through alternative sources (see below).  
 
House Legislative Study Committee on Income-Based Education Property Tax for Vermonters: 
2005 
In 2005, the House Study Committee charged with evaluating and improving the state’s 
property tax adjustment provisions submitted two proposals. The first further simplified 
and streamlined the existing prebate and rebate provisions, while the second called for an 
education income tax. In 2005, the committee proposed a significant lowering of the base 
property tax rate to 30 cents and funding a portion of education through a new 1.5 percent 
education income tax on residents. The first proposal was largely adopted by Act 185, 
passed by the Legislature in 2006 (see below). Vermont’s Joint Fiscal Office is developing a 
proposal for an education income tax for consideration this biennium session.  
 
Some of Vermont’s elected officials have long proposed funding a portion of public 
education through a state income tax. A Democratic proposal for an income tax was 
considered just prior to the Brigham ruling, and a House bill for an education income tax 
advanced but was not approved in 2003.
7 While the existing income-sensitivity provisions 
already allow a majority of Vermonters to pay their property tax liability on the basis of 
income, this approach is popular again in light of growing property tax burdens and the 
complexity of administering the program. However, some are concerned that the higher 
marginal tax rates needed to finance education could negatively affect the economy. Others 
are concerned that because they are relatively sensitive to economic cycles, income tax 
revenues are too volatile to finance expanding education costs.  
 
Act 185: 2006  
As discussed above, each of the following three tax provisions is reduced in the event of a 
surplus in the education fund: (1) the property tax rate on homestead property; (2) the tax 
rate on non-homestead property; and (3) the percentage of household income paid by 
claimants who choose to have their education tax levied on the basis of income rather than 
property value. 
 
Education fund surpluses have enabled the legislature to reduce these rates annually. 
Surpluses have been growing largely as a result of increases in education property tax 
                                                 
7 Vermont House Ways and Means education finance bill (H. 462). 
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 revenues collected from homestead property owners paying their full education property tax 
liability and from non-homestead property owners. As previously discussed, these 
claimants’ property tax liabilities increased due to rising property values. Though tax bills 
for those paying on the basis of income have increased because they are indexed to 
relatively slow income growth, these households have benefited from the proportional 
reductions required for the base income rate.  
 
Because of concerns that these reductions were unfairly benefiting these claimants, whose 
tax bills increased much more slowly than the growing costs of education, Act 185 
established a floor for adjustments for households paying on the basis of income: the 
percent of income that defines the education property tax liability for these households 
cannot be reduced below 1.8 percent.   
 
Act 185 also sought to simplify the way the income-sensitivity provision is administered and 
connected the prebate provision more clearly to education property tax relief. Beginning in 
the fall of 2007, Vermonters will receive their prebate as a discount within their property tax 
bill, rather than as a separate check mailed before the tax bill was due.  
 
Governor Douglas Education Tax Proposal: August 2006 
The governor’s proposal sought to relieve growing tax burdens by capping local education 
spending.  Specifically, the governor proposed capping annual increases in local education 
spending at 4 percent in FY2008 and at 3.5 percent after one year. The proposed limits 
would sunset after five years. A vote by 60 percent of residents would be needed to exceed 
the cap. The scope of this paper does not permit extensive analysis of the pros and cons of 
limiting local education spending in this manner.
8  
 
The governor also sought to dampen the effect of the volatility of the system that equalizes 
property values for some towns. He proposed capping growth in the value of the state 
education grand list in the 25 municipalities with the most rapid appreciation in property 
values. Finally, the proposal would limit another growing cost of the education finance 
system—the prebate and rebate provisions—by decreasing the income limit for eligibility 
and by increasing cap on homestead education property tax liability back to 2 percent of 
income. 
 
                                                 
8 The impact of the proposed education spending limits on property tax burdens, school budgets, or education 
quality in Vermont depends in part on the specific design of the limit. For further discussion about the theory 
and design of state and local tax and expenditure limitations, see Reading the Fine Print: How Details Matter in 
Tax and Expenditure Limitations, New England Public Policy Center, October 2006. 
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 Revolt and Repeal: October 2006 
In September 2006, five Vermont Republicans, declaring that the “…educational financing 
system in use today is fundamentally and irreversibly flawed and cannot be repaired,” 
launched a campaign to repeal the statewide education property tax.  Five towns have 
formally endorsed the initiative and more than 40 have passed resolutions supporting repeal 
of the statewide property tax. The campaign offers no alternative for how to the current 
education finance system. Any new system would have to meet the standards set under 
Brigham ruling unless the Supreme Court reversed or adjusted its decision.  
 
Vermont League of Cities and Towns: October 2006 
The Vermont League of Cities and Towns voted in October 2006 to repeal the laws that 
govern the current education finance system and endorsed guidelines for a new system that 
included less reliance on the property tax. Specifically, the League recommended an 
education income tax.   
 
The League also proposed guidelines to restrain education costs without sacrificing local 
control, such as financial incentives for school consolidation, which the League claims has 
been shown to reduce costs and enhance educational opportunity. The recommendations 
also call on the state to provide schools with the resources needed to educate children, 
proposing that the state clearly delineate core educational costs that would be covered by 
the education fund and require local voters to fund remaining local expenses. This aspect of 
the proposal could be problematic since it essentially reestablishes the foundation aid 
program which the court found unconstitutional under Brigham. 
 
Finally, the League offered several recommendations about how to fairly distribute 
property wealth resources and tax burdens throughout the state, including adjustments to 





While many Vermonters remain committed to an education system that promotes 
substantially equal educational opportunities, some are frustrated with the cost and system 
of paying for it.  Those taxpayers that are ineligible for existing property tax adjustment 
provisions have perceived new types of inequity, galvanizing calls for further reform.  
Rapidly inflating property tax burdens for some (compared to levels that taxpayers are more 
comfortable paying), along with the perceived unfairness of being unable to use local 
resources to fund local education expenditures, drive current reform initiatives. Though the 
property tax is no longer a local resource, some towns resent having their primary and 
traditional resource—property wealth—administered and controlled by the state. 
 
Providing equal education opportunities, containing growing education property tax 
burdens, and resolving this perception of a lack of local control likely cannot be achieved 
simultaneously. An education finance system that is constitutional under the Brigham ruling 
mandates sacrifices on the part of taxpayers for a public good—educated citizens. It remains 
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 to be seen if current proposals can make that sacrifice more palatable or ensure that those 
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 Appendix B 
Court rulings, legislation, and reform proposals 
 
Brigham vs. State  
http://dol.state.vt.us/gopher_root1/supct/166/96-502.op  
 
Act 60  
http://www.leg.state.vt.us/docs/1998/acts/ACT060.HTM 
 





















Vermont League of Cities and Towns education finance reform guidelines 
http://www.vlct.org/  
 
“Revolt and Repeal” campaign website 
http://www.revoltandrepeal.com/index.php  
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